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NOTES
THE UNLUCKY THIRTEENTH: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT IN SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE
INTRODUCrION
In 1992 two Pennsylvania high school students unsuccessfully
sued their school district to contest a new high school curriculum re-
quiring them to perform community service in order to graduate.'
The students in Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District claimed that this
program violated the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.2 The
trial court used a balancing test that focused on the "servitude" in-
volved.3 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, by contrast, used a stan-
dard of relief pioneered in criminal cases to find that the service was
not "involuntary."4 This Note discusses several cases that, like Steirer,
fumble for an appropriate standard to consider Thirteenth Amend-
ment-based civil rights claims. These cases show that Steirer is not
anomalous; in fact, the Thirteenth Amendment is notable for its lack
of a coherent jurisprudence.
5
The absence of a uniform standard for finding involuntary servi-
tude renders the rights of recourse available under the Thirteenth
Amendment unpredictable and largely useless. This Note considers
how Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence could evolve to become a
more meaningful source of individual rights. The Note begins with a
description of the structure and content of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as interpreted by the courts. Next, the Note introduces the
rights of recourse, both civil and criminal, that exist for an individual
who asserts that her Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from in-
voluntary servitude has been violated. The Note explains the stan-
1 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa.), afftd 987 F.2d
989 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993). See infra notes 85-91, 120-25 and
accompanying text.
2 The Thirteenth Amendment states, in its entirety.
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
3 789 F. Supp. at 1345.
4 987 F.2d at 998-1000.
5 The Steirer Circuit Court opinion purports to follow the "general spirit" of the Thir-
teenth Amendment rather than attempting to define its reach. 987 F.2d at 998 (quoting
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)).
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dards used by courts to find and remedy impositions of involuntary
servitude. The cases that apply these standards reveal a confused doc-
trine sorely in need of a unifying vision.
This Note argues that a balancing test like the one used by the
Steirer trial court is more useful and truer to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's vision of liberty than the criminal standard used by the appel-
late court. Consistent application of a balancing test would afford the
Thirteenth Amendment a degree of elasticity and relevance that it
now lacks. Finally, the Note proposes a new method for determining
whether an individual's Thirteenth Amendment rights have been
violated.
I
THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT
A. The First Section: An Affirmative Declaration
The Thirteenth Amendment fulfilled the promise of the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, 6 President Abraham Lincoln's Civil War order
purporting to emancipate the slaves in the rebelling Confederate
states.7 Added to the Constitution in 1865, the Amendment borrowed
6 On January 1, 1863, after the Union's important victory at Antietam, President
Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation of emancipation for African-Americans held in
slavery in Confederate states. Of course, since the states to which the Proclamation applied
were in rebellion, the order carried no immediate effect. The Proclamation stated in perti-
nent part:
That on the Ist day ofJanuary, A.D. 1863, all persons held as slaves within
any State or designated part of a State the people whereof shall then be in
rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and for-
ever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the
military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the free-
dom of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or
any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.
President Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation, repinted in THE UNwERsAL ALMANAC 42 (John
W. Wright ed., 1989).
7 The Thirteenth Amendment effectively altered the then-existing Constitution by
shifting so much power to the federal government and by taking an explicit stand on the
slavery issue. In fact, the original Constitution had prohibited Congress from legislating
against the slave trade in an ambiguously worded provision: "The Migration or Importa-
tion of Such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not
be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight,
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
The Thirteenth Amendment also overruled, along with the Fourteenth Amendment,
the scandalous holding of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S., (19 How.) 393 (1856), which
held that African-Americans were not citizens of the United States and therefore could not
sue in federal court. Dred Scott saw blacks as "property" under the Constitution. As such,
they could rightfully be held as slaves even in those states where slavery had been abolished
by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. (The Missouri Compromise of 1820 was, as the
name suggests, a legislative compromise allowing slavery in the new state of Missouri but
forbidding it in the new state of Maine and in the outlying territories of the Louisiana
1995]
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its wording from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.8 The first section
of the Amendment states that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction."9 This announcement of the demise of
slavery has been described as a "grand yet simple declaration of the
personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this
government," 10 yet the complexity of Thirteenth Amendment doc-
trine belies this supposed simplicity.
The first section of the Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalizes
the outcome of the Civil War by abolishing the southern institution of
slavery, but it is unclear how the proscription of involuntary servitude
in addition to "slavery" broadens the scope of the Amendment. By
forbidding not only slavery but also factual situations that resemble
slavery, the Framers expressed a view of personal liberty that extends
beyond freedom from legal ownership by another person. The Fram-
ers intended the Amendment to reach conduct other than slavehold-
ing as it existed before the Civil War. By including a term that
requires judicial definition, the Framers gave the Amendment a pro-
spective purpose beyond the commemoration of a military victory.
Purchase, of which Missouri had been a part. This Act perpetuated the balance between
the slave states and the anti-slavery states. THE NEW AMERIC.N DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA 778
(1984)). Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment dramatically changed, rather than supple-
mented, constitutional rights.
8 This ordinance prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory, the area northwest of
the Ohio River, later called the Indiana Territory:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Terri-
tory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted: provided, always, that any person escaping into
the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the
original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the
person claiming his or her labor or services as aforesaid.
ORDINANCE OF 1787, AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED
STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO, art. VI, reprinted in ISAAC F. PATTERSON, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF OHIO 52 (1912).
Thomas Jefferson had used nearly identical words three years earlier, in a proposal
made under the Articles of Confederation: "That after the year 1800 of the Christian era,
there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, otherwise
than in punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted to be per-
sonally guilty." COMMITTEE OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, A PLAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REGIONS WEST OF THE APPALACHIAN MOUNTAINS, 24JouRNA-S OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 247 (1784), quoted in Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L BJ. 26, 48 (1951).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Because the Amendment creates an exception when the
party has been convicted of a crime, the doctrines discussed herein do not apply to prison-
ers. However, a growing body of case law explores the effect of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment upon juvenile detention systems. Because youthful offenders usually are not "duly
convicted," they may not be subject to involuntary servitude. See Donald C. Hancock, Com-
ment, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Juvenile Justice System, 83J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
614 (1992).
10 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).
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However, nearly 130 years ofjudicial construction have failed to pro-
vide a uniform definition of involuntary servitude' and thus have
failed to afford the Thirteenth Amendment a clear role in the shaping
of civil fights law. Notwithstanding Justice Miller's statement in the
Slaughter-House Cases that the Thirteenth Amendment could "hardly
* . . admit of construction,"12 that case was among many that have
attempted to construe the term "involuntary servitude."13
One of the few common themes of Thirteenth Amendment juris-
prudence is the overall restraint with which courts have defined the
scope of the first section. One reason for this restraint is that the
Thirteenth Amendment covers private conduct as well as state ac-
tion.' 4 Read literally, the Thirteenth Amendment touches any private
action that results in personal slavery or involuntary servitude. To
avoid taking the Thirteenth Amendment to its literal limits and al-
lowing a tort action for anyone deprived of a Thirteenth Amendment
right, courts have reduced the self-executing power of the Amend-
ment's first section through limiting constructions. 15 At the same
time, courts increasingly have deferred to Congress' power to enforce
the Amendment through the enactment of legislation under the
Amendment's second section.
B. The Second Section: A Blank Check to Congress
The second and final section of the Thirteenth Amendment
states that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
11 SeeJames H. Haag, Comment, Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-Century Concept in
Search of a Twentieth-Century Definition, 19 PAC. L.J. 873, 876-77 (1988).
12 83 U.S. at 69.
13 The Slaughter-House Cases considered a challenge to a Louisiana law that restricted
the location and operation of slaughterhouses in the state, essentially creating a monopoly.
Id. at 83 (FieldJ, dissenting). The majority described the challengers' Thirteenth Amend-
ment construction as "a microscopic search ... to find in it a reference to servitudes, which
may have been attached to property in certain localities." Id. at 69. Justice Field's dissent
found the plaintiffs' Thirteenth Amendment argument more persuasive, though he would
have decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 93. Field stated that the
restrictions placed upon butchers for the pursuit of their trade were onerous enough to
call into mind involuntary servitude: "The compulsion which would force him to labor
even for his own benefit only in one direction, or in one place, would be almost as oppres-
sive and nearly as great an invasion of his liberty as the compulsion which would force him
to labor for the benefit or pleasure of another, and would equally constitute an element of
servitude." Id. at 90 (Field,J, dissenting). See infra part III for a discussion of the consider-
able case law on this issue.
14 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTImONAL LA-w § 5-13, at 333 (2d ed. 1988).
15 As developed infra part III, the primary devices used by courts to limit the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment consist of applying a criminal statutory definition of involun-




priate legislation."16 In an early construction of the Amendment, the
Supreme Court asserted:
This amendment... is undoubtedly self-executing without any an-
cillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing
state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abol-
ished slavery, and established universal freedom. Still, legislation
may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and cir-
cumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of
redress for its violation in letter or spirit.17
The first section of the Amendment prohibits only conduct that falls
within the narrow but nebulous territory of slavery or involuntary ser-
vitude. Under the aegis of the second section, however, Congress en-
forces the Thirteenth Amendment when it prohibits conduct or laws
that subject individuals to the same type of degradatidn that slavery
imposed.18 These conditions are called the "badges of slavery," or
sometimes "badges of servitude." 19 For example, soon after the Thir-
16 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII. Congress' first statutory enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment's grant of liberty was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. This
Act was an immediate and important supplement to the Thirteenth Amendment. The
constitutional amendment introduced only a vague ideal of liberty, the Civil Rights enact-
ments made this ideal concrete by specifying the rights and privileges that Congress saw as
essential to freedom from slavery. "The common denominator, settled in men's minds by
thirty years of abolitionist proselytization . . . , was thus the concept of the equal protection
of the laws for men's civil, i.e., natural, rights." Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 185 (1951). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment reinforced the congressional mission by providing added support for this expansive
view of the attributes of freedom. Id. at 201-02.
17 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
18 Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe calls this a grant of "affirmative authority" to
Congress. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 5-2, at 300.
19 The phrase "badges of slavery/servitude" entered into Thirteenth Amendment
doctrine during the congressional debates over passage of the Amendment. According to
Senator Trumbull, one of the Amendment's framers, "any statute which is not equal to all,
and which deprives any citizen of civil rights, which are secured to other citizens, is an
unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and it is in fact a badge of servitude which by the
Constitution is prohibited." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866), quoted in
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 92 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
Use of the phrase "badge of slavery" in other contexts predates the Thirteenth
Amendment. It can be found, for instance, in the defendant's brief to the Supreme Court
in Williams v. Ash, 42 U.S. 1 (1843), an 1843 case declaring a former slave free pursuant to
the testamentary instrument of his former owner. The defendant, who had imprisoned
the former slave, stated that "[c]olour, in a slaveholding state is a badge of slavery." Id. at 5
(Mr. Bradley, for the defendant). In this sense, "badges" of slavery are equated with physi-
cal "indicia," rather than conditions of life.
Senator Trumbull's take on badges of slavery appeared in a Supreme Court opinion
considering the Thirteenth Amendment-based Civil Rights Act of 1866. Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871). In this case, the Supreme Court denied federal
jurisdiction over a white defendant whose murder of several African-Americans was wit-
nessed only by African-Americans and whose trial in state court would be subject to a Ken-
tucky law forbidding African-Americans from giving courtroom testimony. The issue in the
case was whether Kentucky's evidence rule violated the Civil Rights Act. If it did, then a
[Vol. 80:372
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teenth Amendment was passed, several southern states enacted the
Black Codes, which prevented blacks from enjoying the same privi-
leges as whites, such as owning property or suing in courts of law.
Congress designated these laws "badges of slavery."20 Current exam-
ples of congressionally-defined badges of slavery include discrimina-
tion in the making or enforcement of contracts 21 and in the sale or
lease of housing.
22
In the years following ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court narrowly construed Congress' power under the
second section by using a restrictive definition of the badges of slav-
ery. In 1883, the Civil Rights Case3s struck down federal legislation
purporting to create a claim for money damages on behalf of anyone
denied equal access to "accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and
other places of public amusement."24 The Supreme Court stated that
actionable conduct under the Amendment included only "the insepa-
rable incidents of the institution"25 of slavery, such as "[c ] ompulsory
service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his move-
federal court could try the case. The Supreme Court majority balked at creating a federal
forum for criminal prosecutions it said were best left to the states. A dissenting Justice
Bradley argued for federaljurisdiction. In Bradley's opinion, defining conduct as a badge
of slavery was the first step in an expansive statutory construction. Since denial of federal
jurisdiction in such a case severely affected the civil liberty of African-Americans, Justice
Bradley observed that "[to deprive a whole class of the community of this right, to refuse
their evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slaer, is to
expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families,
and their property unprotected by law." Id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis ad-
ded). Justice Bradley went on to say that the majority's rule "gives unrestricted license and
impunity to vindictive outlaws and felons to rush upon these helpless people and kill and
slay them at will, as was done in this case.... [The majority takes] a view of the law too
narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view." Id- The
badge of slavery here was the denial ofjustice in the state courts.
20 These laws were a primary target of federal civil rights legislation passed under the
Thirteenth Amendment's second section. The congressional debates over passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 included the following description of the Black Codes:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in
nearly all the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them
certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them
the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the
existence of slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill
under consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into
effect the [Thirteenth] amendment.
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 387 (1982) (alteration
in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
23 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 2, 18 Stat. 336.
25 109 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
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ments ... [and] disability to hold property."26 The Court reserved for
itself the task of delineating the incidents of slavery, and exclusion
from recreational facilities did not qualify.
27
The restrictive construction found in the Civil Rights Cases con-
trasts with the deference courts now pay to Congress' Thirteenth
Amendment power. The 1968 case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.28 estab-
lished the modem trend when it applied a federal civil rights law
passed under the Thirteenth Amendment29 to a case of private dis-
crimination in housing sales.. In Jones, an African-American plaintiff
sued a realty company that had refused to sell him a home solely be-
cause of his race.30 The defendant challenged the constitutionality of
the statute underlying the plaintiff's claim, but the Court found that
the Thirteenth Amendment's second section could support federal
legislation against private discrimination. Unlike the Civil Rights Cases,
Jones credited Congress with authority to define broadly the incidents
of slavery.
31
C. Treatments of the First and Second Sections Compared
Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe opined that "[i]f Jones is
read literally, Congress possesses a power to protect individual rights
under the Thirteenth Amendment which is as open-ended as its
power to regulate interstate commerce."32 Indeed, this seems to be
the case. Courts now test federal laws passed pursuant to the Thir-
teenth Amendment's second section using a "minimum rationality
standard"33 like the one used in Commerce Clause cases. By contrast,
courts have placed many restrictions on the use of the Amendment's
26 Id.
27 Id. at 24. The Supreme Court later found segregation of private facilities reachable
under Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
28 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
29 Jones applied 42 U.S.C. § 1982. According to the Court, this Act originally was part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 392 U.S. at 422. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was re-
enacted as the Enforcement Act of 1870, two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which reaches state action but not private action. In order to find that
§ 1982 reached private conduct, the Court stated that although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment supported the re-enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1870, it did not replace the
Thirteenth Amendment as sole authority for the Act. Id. at 436.
30 392 U.S. at 412.
31 Id. at 440.
32 TRIBE, supra note 14, § 5-13, at 332.
33 Rhode Island Chapter, Ass'd Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338,
364-5 (D.R.I. 1978) (upholding a federal statute requiring 10% of state labor contracts to
go to minority-owned businesses on the theory that discrimination in contracting is a ves-
tige of slavery). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (finding that Con-
gress has power to prohibit discriminatory admissions policies at private schools, so that "a
dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man." (quotingJones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968))).
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self-executing first section. When individual litigants press constitu-
tional claims based on the denial of Thirteenth Amendment rights,
the courts do not ask if their experiences were "minimally related" to
slavery.3
4
Under the enumerated powers interpretation, the first section
prohibits a narrow range of conduct, while the second section lays
open to congressional regulation a broad field of human rights and
relations. If this is true, the two sections might as well be separate
amendments. The flaw in the enumerated powers model is that the
Jones Court agreed with Congress that private discrimination in hous-
ing sales falls within the Thirteenth Amendment's reach, saying "when
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery."35 If the Supreme Court in Jones agreed with Congress that
the inability to purchase property is a clear incident of slavery, why did
it not fall within the Amendment's self-executing power? A possible
explanation for this is that the relationship between the first and sec-
ond sections of the Amendment offers a flexible amount ofjudicially-
defined "give," much like an elastic waistband, subject if necessary to
judicial belt-tightening.
Another view of the dichotomy between the judicial restraint in
constructing the Amendment's first section and the liberal grant of
power found in the second section is that the Court has abdicated its
role as interpreter of the Constitution. The Court will not define in-
voluntary servitude but will allow Congress to do so when it enforces
the proscription on involuntary servitude. By allowing Congress to de-
termine the reach of the Amendment's proscription, then, the Jones
rule allows Congress to define its own power. Under this view, Con-
gress may define behavior as incident to slavery even when the Court
would not, and then legislate against it.36 In effect, the Amendment's
34 See infra part II.
35 Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-43. In support of its sweeping view of the incidents of slavery,
the Jones Court turned to the intent of the Thirteenth Amendment framers. Senator
Trumbull of Illinois, identified in the opinion as a proponent of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, declared that "the trumpet of freedom that we have been blowing throughout the
land has given an 'uncertain sound,' and the promised freedom is a delusion. Such was
not the intention of Congress, which proposed the constitutional amendment, nor is such
the fair meaning of the amendment itself." Id. at 440 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 322 (1864)). As the Jones Court put it, "[s]urely Senator Trumbull was right.
Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that deter-
mination into effective legislation." Id. at 440.
36 A similar anomaly arose in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment. This
amendment has an enforcement provision similar in scope to § 2 of the Thirteenth. It
provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), the Supreme Court upheld congressional legislation passed pursuant to § 5 with-
1995]
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prohibitive force can be tapped or left dormant by Congress. Under
this view, however, behavior that Congress targets under the second
section should be considered to be facially prohibited by the first sec-
tion, per congressional construction. It is not clear that the Jones
Court thought this was so.
This Note takes issue with construction of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as merely an enumerated power rather than a source of individ-
ual freedoms. It is true that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. breathed life
into Thirteenth Amendment doctrine by construing liberally Con-
gress' power under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Jones decision
paved the way for more expansive federal statutes to remedy private
discrimination. However, Jones' use of congressional intent as the
measure of the Thirteenth Amendment's scope delegated the deter-
mination of constitutional rights to the shifting political process.
Moreover, Jones places so much emphasis on the role of the Amend-
ment's second section in delegating power to Congress that it essen-
tially deprives the first section of any affirmative power.
II
RIGHTS OF RECOURSE UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Private Causes of Action Under Civil Rights Statutes
Judicial deference to Congress' role as interpreter of the Thir-
teenth Amendment creates a considerable barrier to plaintiffs seeking
to vindicate Thirteenth Amendment-based rights. Although federal
legislation may create a cause of action against conduct that Congress
perceives to be a badge of slavery,37 plaintiffs* cannot challenge actions
that they believe are badges of slavery in the absence of specific con-
gressional authorization. 38 In one case, a court rejected the argument
out making an independent determination as to whether the conduct targeted by the stat-
ute (English literacy requirements imposed on voters by the states) actually violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court framed the issue: "Without regard to whether the
judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's English
literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state
law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?" Id. at 649.
Commentators remarked widely upon the Court's approach in Morgan. SeeJesse H.
Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil
Rights Amendments, 67 MnN. L. REv. 299, 308 (1982) (citing several other scholars who saw
the Court as leaving constitutional interpretation in the hands of the legislature); DanielJ.
Leffell, Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1270
(1980) (explaining that, under Morgan, "Congress can independently apply tests formu-
lated by the Court to invalidate practices that the Court itself might uphold").
The Supreme Court seems to have backed down somewhat from the expansive con-
gressional power afforded by Morgan. Specifically, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970), casts doubt on the continuing validity of Morgan. See Choper, supra, at 323-34.
37 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988).
38 This Note addresses the barrier to litigation that arises when courts refuse to inter-
pret "involuntary servitude" and instead leave construction of an affirmative constitutional
[Vol. 80:372
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that a New York law requiring adoption records to be sealed imposed
an incident of slavery.39 The plaintiffs argued that, like slaves sold to
strangers and separated from their families, adopted children suffer
harm by not knowing their biological parents' identities. 40 The court
did not consider the validity of the plaintiffs' perception; instead, the
court stated that it could not create new categories of badges of slavery
at the urging of civil claimants. 4
1
A plaintiff who claims that she was deprived of her right to be free
from involuntary servitude may sue under one of two federal statutes
that create causes of action based on the deprivation of constitutional
rights. First, when the deprivation occurs "under color of state law,"42
the plaintiff may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4s Detailed discussion of
right to the legislative branch. This Note forgoes consideration of some procedural barri-
ers, such as sovereign immunity and the availability of implied rights of action. For a dis-
cussion of the former issue, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A
Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 817-25 (1993). For an
example of the latter problem, see Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I.
1978), affd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (refusing to recognize an implied cause of action
under the Thirteenth Amendment and dismissing plaintiff's suit against the "Moonies").
39 Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
40 Id. at 1237.
41 Id. See also City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (declaring constitutional
the closing of a street that connected a predominantly white neighborhood with a
predominantly black one); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (upholding
against constitutional attack a town's decision to close its municipal pools rather than de-
segregate them. The Court left open the question of whether the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's second section could reach this discriminatory action, saying only that the statute
involved did not intend to cover such behavior.); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1564
(11th Cir. 1990) (finding that even if flying the Confederate flag above Alabama's capitol
dome was a badge of slavery, plaintiffs could not challenge it without a statutory basis for
their action); Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding no Thirteenth
Amendment cause of action in employment discrimination case and pointing out the ade-
quacy of the statutory remedy); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (upholding a workplace prohibition on "corn-rowed" hair, a style popular with Afri-
can-Americans, and saying that the Thirteenth Amendment protects against discriminatory
employment conditions only where the plaintiff is prohibited from leaving her job).
Under the reasoning in Jones, Congress ostensibly could enact laws against the conduct
involved in these cases.
42 The term "under color of state law" is treated as roughly equivalent to the state
action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787
(1966) (applying the "under color of law" provision of § 1983's criminal counterpart, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1988)).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
The doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity limit the applicability of § 1983 in
many cases. Detailed discussion of these topics lies outside the scope of this Note. Briefly
stated, the sovereign immunity defense, rooted in the Eleventh Amendment, is not avail-
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these issues lies outside the scope of this Note. Alternatively, section
1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act 44 creates a cause of action against a
private defendant who deprives another of the right to be free from
involuntary servitude. Unfortunately for plaintiffs seeking redress
under this statute, judicial unease over a comprehensive federal tort
for dignitary wrongs has prompted an intimidating list of require-
ments.45 The elements of a cause of action under § 1985(3) are not
able in a state court action. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). In federal courts, where
the Eleventh Amendment is effective, sovereign immunity protects the states themselves
(who are not "persons" under the statute) from suit, but § 1983 actions still may be as-
serted against political subdivisions of the states. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
717-21 (1973). State officials acting in their official capacities are protected by sovereign
immunity, but when acting in their individual capacities may be sued. Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21 (1991). Sovereign immunity, however, does not prevent the imposition of prospec-
tive injunctive relief. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).
For a critique of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). Qualified immunity does not bar suits altogether
but does provide a defense for a government official who did not have reason to know that
she was violating a constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff. This common law doc-
trine is so liberally applied that, according to one writer, "[t]he only defendants remaining
unimmunized are co-conspirators (who were never state actors) and counties and munici-
palities (which are hard to picture as persons)." A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity
in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions, 71 TEx. L. REv. 123, 125-26 (1992).
44 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988). The Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988) is based
on the Conspiracy Act of 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284, and the Civil Rights Act of 1971, ch. 22,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 13. See Janet A. Barbiere, Note, Conspiracies to Obstruct Justice in the Federal
Courts: Defining the Scope of Section 1985(2), 50 FoRDHI-m L. Rxv. 1210, 1240 n.59 (1982).
The relevant provision, § 1985(3), states in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; or for the purpose or preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; ... in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
Because the Thirteenth Amendment reaches private action, plaintiffs can sue private enti-
ties under the Ku Klux Klan Act for deprivation of Thirteenth Amendment rights.
45 State law provides a remedy for the dignitary wrong of false imprisonment. Accord-
ing to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965):
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within
boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the
other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in subsection
(1) (a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a merely transitory or
otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an unreasona-
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set out in the statute itself but were defined by the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. Breckenridge.
46
In order to demonstrate a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
show: (1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of
equal privileges and immunities, and (3) an act performed in further-
ance of the object of the conspiracy, (4) which injured the plaintiff
and/or deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.47 The
Supreme Court has analogized the second requirement to Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection doctrine and therefore requires proof
of a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus" 48 on the part of the defendant.
The requirement of a class-based animus most clearly links the
right of action to its underlying constitutional justification. Griffin
prevented § 1985(3) from upsetting the balance between the federal
and state governments by applying a limiting construction. 49 Only
when the defendant acts out of an arbitrary class prejudice of the sort
the Constitution prohibits will federal courts provide a remedy.
Subsequent case law has further limited § 1985(3) by construing
narrowly the class-based animus that will satisfy Griffin's second re-
quirement. In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,50 plaintiff re-
productive health clinics sought to prove that defendant protestors
were motivated by a discriminatory animus towards women seeking
ble risk of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the
risk threatened bodily harm.
46 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The limitations this holding imposed on § 1985(3) attempted
to restrict the creation ofjudicial torts from the fabric of the Constitution: "That the stat-
ute was meant to reach private action does not.., mean that it was intended to apply to all
tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others." Id. at 101. It has been
suggested that this rationale is ironic, if not disingenuous, and that the test is not entirely
faithful to the wording of the statute itself. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 771 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). Note that only actions based on deprivation of a Thir-
teenth Amendment right or the right of interstate travel may be brought against private
defendants, as these are the only constitutional rights protected against private encroach-
ment. Id. at 105. A § 1985 plaintiff must allege state action in order to enforce other
constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment right to free speech.
48 Id. at 102. Countervailing against these stringent requirements is the stated judicial
trend to "accord (to the civil rights statutes) a sweep as broad as (their) language." Rich-
ardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1971). As this Note demonstrates, it is
difficult to see how courts have paid deference to this policy in their Thirteenth Amend-
ment-based decisions.
49 The Court in Griffin stated that "[t]he constitutional shoals that would lie in the
path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose - by requiring, as an element of the cause of action,
... [an] invidiously discriminatory motivation." Id. at 102. But see General Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 411-12 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an intent requirement for § 1981 actions violates the legislative purpose of the Civil
Rights Acts, which were enacted to remedy "not only flagrant, intentional discrimination,
but also ... more subtle forms of discrimination.").
50 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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abortions, or women in general.5 1 The Court denied both these asser-
tions, stating that pursuit of an activity opposed by the defendants can-
not serve as the basis of class-designation.
5 2
The effect of the limitations on § 1983, which applies only to state
action, and § 1985(3), with its judicially-created elements, is that
plaintiffs must overcome a variety of statutory hurdles to get into court
with their Thirteenth Amendment claims.5 3 This point becomes im-
portant when considered alongside the substantive hurdle confronted
by litigants: the courts' narrow constructions of and broad expecta-
tions to the Thirteenth Amendment itself. This Note criticizes limit-
ing interpretations of the Amendment when procedural devices exist
to dismiss frivolous federal tort claims.
B. The Criminal Statutes
An analysis of the meaning of "involuntary servitude" in the civil
context first requires discussion of the criminal statutes implementing
the Thirteenth Amendment. The statutes codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1581-158854 criminalize the imposition of slavery or involuntary ser-
vitude as well as participation in the sale, seizure, or transport of
slaves. Unlike § 1983 and the Ku Klux Klan Act, which offer rights of
recourse for the general deprivation of constitutional rights, these
criminal statutes explicitly refer to involuntary servitude.55 Therefore,
it is in the criminal cases that courts most frequently are forced to
decide what the Framers meant by "involuntary servitude" as used in
51 Id. at 759.
52 Id. The Scalia opinion borrows from equal protection doctrine the purpose/im-
pact distinction in finding no class-based animus towards women in general. Even though
women are the class affected by abortion opponents' actions, Scalia contended that an
effect on a class will not satisfy the statute's motivational requirement. It. at 761.
In his partial dissent, Justice Souter asserted that this limitation on § 1985(3) reached
"the point of overkill." Id. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Souter's reading of the relevant legislative history indicates that the statute was intended to
reach discrimination based on such classifications as religious or political affiliation. Sena-
tor Edmunds opined that the statute could reach discrimination inflicted upon a plaintiff
"because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was
a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter." Edmunds' statement refers to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, on which § 1985(3) is based. Id. at 773 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871)).
53 Bray's effect can be seen in a recent case in which Bray's fact pattern was reversed.
In Amnesty Am. v. County of Allegheny, 822 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1993), plaintiffi, a
group of anti-choice demonstrators, were arrested while blockading a clinic. The protes-
tors unsuccessfully sued under § 1985(3) for involuntary servitude arising from their being
forced away from the premises. The court dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment claims
under § 1985(3), finding Bray's definition of classes controlling. Id. at 300. The court also
noted that the claims were without merit, id., but the statutory requirements may fairly be
said to perform a gatekeeping function.
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 (1969).
55 But see 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (making it a crime for two or more persons to con-
spire to deprive another of a constitutionally-secured right).
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the Thirteenth Amendment. Unlike courts hearing civil cases, which
may invoke the strict requirements of the civil rights statutes to avoid
reasoned elaboration of this crucial term, the criminal courts must
look to the meaning of involuntary servitude to decide cases.
In addition to prohibiting involuntary servitude, the criminal stat-
utes criminalize "peonage." Peonage is the compulsion of labor in
payment of a debt.5 6 Some courts have contended that the elimina-
tion of peonage was one of the goals of the Thirteenth Amendment,
57
and the Amendment has regularly been invoked in decisions con-
demning peonage.58 In fact, peonage had been forbidden at com-
mon law by the time the Amendment was ratified.59 The relevance of
the Thirteenth Amendment to peonage cases, besides providing a
convenient basis for congressional and judicial rulemaking power, is
that it provides a standard by which to determine the voluntariness of
labor performed pursuant to a debt.6 0 This standard is potentially
useful in fleshing out the meaning of involuntary servitude. The next
section discusses the standard of voluntariness by which criminal
courts have analyzed imposed servitudes.
56 BLAcK's LAw DiaoNARY 1135 (6th ed. 1990). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1988)
(declaring null and void all contracts effecting peonage).
57 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This infamous case that sanctioned "sepa-
rate but equal" accommodations for African-Americans counted among the Amendment's
targets "Mexican peonage [and) the Chinese coolie trade." Id. at 542.
58 See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
59 Debtors' prisons were already a thing of the past when the Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified, and specific performance was not allowed as a remedy for breach of a personal
service contract. See generally American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y.
1981) (discussing courts' longstanding refusal to compel labor in fulfillment of a legal
obligation).
60 The Thirteenth Amendment's mandate for "free and voluntary labor," Pollock, 322
U.S. at 17, supports the outcomes in cases striking down state laws imposing peonage. The
distinction between peonage and voluntary labor in payment of a debt lies in the existence
of a choice "In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by
labor or service, and subject, like any other contractor, to an action for damages for breach
of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance
or a continuance of the service." Clyat 197 U.S. at 215-16.
One logically challenging aspect of the relationship between the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and peonage doctrine is that the Amendment permits the compulsion of labor on
the part of an individual who has been duly convicted of a crime. Thus, an early (and
ironic) argument was that the Thirteenth Amendment could support the imposition of
peonage. Under this argument, if a state criminalizes the failure to honor contracts, con-
victions under the applicable law would justify the imposition of mandatory performance
as punishment. The Supreme Court has rejected this argument: "The State may impose
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor
for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform
the service or pay the debt." Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244. Under Bailey, state peonage statutes
are unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment. This case and the voluntariness
rationale show that peonage and involuntary servitude may coincide on the continuum




JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
A. The Criminal Standard
Courts assessing criminal violations of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment have shifted over time from examination of the conditions im-
posed to inquiry into the methods used to secure the services
involved. A criminal case from 1947, United States v. Ingalls,61 quoted
several dictionary definitions of "slavery" and "servitude" before find-
ing the defendant guilty of imposing involuntary servitude. 62 The
court did not rely on the methods used by the defendant; the defini-
tional approach depended upon the conditions imposed. Later cases
found the central issue to be whether the service performed was vol-
untary, but disagreed over what forms of coercion were necessary to
show that the defendant had deprived the victim of choice.63 In 1988
61 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947). This case involved the criminal prosecution of a
woman who held a 17-year-old girl in servitude. The girl, Dora Jones, was seduced, or
perhaps raped, by the defendant Ingalls's husband, and the defendant pressured Jones
into having an abortion. Over the next 25 years, Ingalls subjected Jones to increasingly
abusive conditions, oppressive working hours, and, eventually, no pay. Jones was pre-
vented from leaving Ingalls's employ by Ingalls's constant threat to turn Jones over to the
authorities and to revealJones's participation in the adultery and abortion, both of which
were illegal at the time. The district court convicted Ingalls under the then-current federal
statute making it a crime to subject another to involuntary servitude. 18 U.S.C. § 443
(1940).
62 Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. at 79.
63 See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964), which considered the
criminal conviction of a chicken farmer who arranged for a Mexican family to immigrate
to the United States to work on his farm. In a case that seems to have straddled the line
between peonage and involuntary servitude, the defendant, Shackney, made Luis Oros
sign promissory notes amounting to $1200 in order to cover Shackney's expenses in bring-
ing the Oros family to Connecticut and providing their food and lodging. Shackney told
Oros that he could arrange for the family's deportation if they sought to leave the farm.
He claimed to possess the power and money to make sure the Oros's would never return to
the United States.
Shackney was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (making it a crime to subject an
individual to peonage) and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1969) (making it a crime to place an individ-
ual in involuntary servitude). The district court convicted Shackney, but the circuit court
reversed, finding that the methods used to retain the Oros family's services did not impli-
cate the Thirteenth Amendment. The criminal context demanded a clear definition of
what behavior could be punished. The court stated that whatever behavior might satisfy
this demand, the threat of deportation as a means of coercing continued service did not.
Such "psychological coercion" was too vague to form the basis of a criminal conviction.
333 F.2d at 486.
Compare United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), where defendants
enticed Indonesian immigrants to come to the United States and work in exploitative situa-
tions. They were prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1969) (criminalizing holding in pe-
onage), § 1583 (1969) (criminalizing enticing into involuntary servitude), and § 1584
(1969) (criminalizing holding in involuntary servitude). The district court dismissed the
case but the circuit court reversed and remanded, defining involuntariness as encompass-
ing psychological coercion. 776 F.2d at 1453. The circuit court used an intent-based test,
which asked whether the defendant intended to subjugate the will of the victim, and
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the Supreme Court handed down a decision that set the standard for
involuntary servitude in the criminal context.
United States v. Kozminski5 involved a Michigan farm family that
kept two unpaid laborers in involuntary servitude. The laborers, Rob-
ert Fulmer and Louis Molitaris, were both in their sixties, but were
mentally and emotionally at the level of persons eight to ten years old.
While on the defendants' farm, they received inadequate food, hous-
ing, clothing, and medical care and worked sixteen hour days, seven
days a week. They were prevented from leaving the defendants' prop-
erty, cut off from friends and relatives, and regularly beaten. The
Supreme Court found that this treatment constituted involuntary ser-
vitude under the relevant federal criminal statutes.
65
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion creates a bright-line rule
that finds criminal involuntary servitude only when the victim is
forced to work by a threat of either physical force or legal sanction.
66
whether a reasonable person in the victim's situation would believe that she or he had no
choice but to do the defandant's bidding. Id. It was critical in this case that the victims
spoke no English and that the defendants paid less than minimum wage. Id.
64 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
65 The Kozminskis were prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1584 (1988). Section
241 makes it a crime to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights, while
section 1584 directly implements the Thirteenth Amendment by making it a crime to sub-
ject another to involuntary servitude.
According to the reasoning in Kozminski, the requirements of the two statutes are the
same. Section 241, by criminalizing a deprivation of constitutional rights, depends upon
the interpretation of the constitutional provision involved, in this case the Thirteenth
Amendment. 487 U.S. at 941. Section 1584, by using the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment itself, relies for its application on the construction of the Amendment Id. at
945.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) states in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimi-
date any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to impris-
onment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1988) states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells
into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term,
or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
66 487 U.S. at 952. The district court convicted the Kozminskis, citing their psycho-
logical coercion of the two men. See id. at 936-37 (describing lower court opinion). The
court of appeals reversed, finding the test of psychological coercion too broad. Nonethe-
less, the Sixth Circuit focused on the victims' states of mind, finding that if they were
"incapable of making a rational choice," their condition would amount to involuntary ser-
vitude. 821 F.2d 1186, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court,'affirming the circuit




The Court stated that "psychological coercion"67 was not a criminal
act under the statutes; such an interpretation "would delegate to pros-
ecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what
type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they
should be punished as crimes."68 Only physical or legal threats mani-
fest the requisite criminal mindset under these statutes.
The most important rationale for Kozminski's narrow meaning of
involuntary servitude was the case's criminal context.69 The Court
noted that the Due Process Clause requires clear notice of what behav-
ior will subject the actor to criminal liability.70 "Case-by-case"71 deter-
mination of criminal sanctions would not satisfy this constitutional
notice requirement. Because the standards for criminal statutes must
be constant, the Court reasoned that the term "involuntary servitude"
must carry a fixed and predictable meaning when applied in criminal
actions.
Kozminski did not purport to limit the reach of the Thirteenth
Amendment itself. The opinion "drawEs] no conclusions ... about
the potential scope of the Thirteenth Amendment,"72 in its interpreta-
67 487 U.S. at 944. It is unclear exactly how the Court defines psychological coercion,
especially in light of the fact that the majority standard takes into account the particular
vulnerabilities of the victim. For example, the majority opinion hypothesizes that "a child
who is told he can go home late at night in the dark through a strange area may be subject
to physical coercion that results in his staying, although a competent adult plainly would
not be." Id. at 948. The majority opinion goes on to say that threatening to deport an
immigrant laborer could be considered a threat of legal action, "even though such a threat
made to... [a citizen] would be too implausible to produce involuntary servitude." Id.
These hypotheticals blur the majority's supposedly bright line by expanding the defi-
nitions of "physical" and "legal." Furthermore, the hypotheticals look at the victim's,
rather than the defendant's, mental state. By focusing on the mental state of someone
other than the defendant, the majority ignored its own criminal context rationale. Finally,
the idea that a threat may be too "implausible" to impose involuntary servitude introduces
a clearly psychological element into the coercion involved, since the believability of a
threat may be enhanced through mental and emotional manipulation. Justice Brennan's
concurrence takes advantage of these inconsistencies. Of the "dark and strange neighbor-
hood" hypothetical, Brennan wrote: "[L]abeling such coercion 'physical' is at best
strained and... accomplishes little but the elimination of whatever certainty the 'physical
or legal coercion' test would otherwise provide." Id. at 958 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 949.
69 Kozminski also cited several precedents in which the elements of physical coercion
or threat of imprisonment were present. Id. at 943 (citing Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4
(1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133
(1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905)). A case note written soon after the Kozminski opinion took exception with this use
of precedent. Kenneth T. Koonce,Jr., Note, United States v. Kozminski: On the Threshold of
Involuntay Servitude, 16 PEPP. L. Ray. 689 (1989). The cases Kozminski cited were decided
in the absence of an authoritative definition of the criminal standard; they explicitly
awaited a Supreme Court decision defining the standard. Therefore, the Supreme Court's
reliance on their decisions effects a rather ironic circularity. Id.
70 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949.
71 Id. at 951.
72 Id. at 944.
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tion of the enforcing criminal statutes.73 The Court never attempted
to define involuntary servitude in its constitutional sense, though the
opinion does reprint the often-quoted description of involuntary servi-
tude as "labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation
would tend to produce like undesirable results."74 This description of
the Amendment imputes to it no limitation on the possible methods
of coercion. In fact, Kozminski explicitly granted to Congress the
power to redraw the statutes according to a more expansive view of
the Amendment's scope.75
Although the judgment of the Court was unanimous, the reason-
ing and bright-line rule espoused by the majority drew support from
only fiveJustices.76 Justice Brennan's concurrence takes issue with the
majority's narrow reading of the criminal statutes, 77 pointing out that
neither the Amendment nor the statute limited the methods by which
involuntary servitude may be imposed. Brennan's opinion, joined by
Justice Marshall, defines servitude with reference to the conditions im-
posed rather than the defendant's chosen strategy in imposing them:
"Congress clearly intended to encompass coercion of any form that
actually succeeds in reducing the victim to a condition of servitude
resembling that in which slaves were held before the Civil War."78 In
other words, Brennan focused on the nature of the servitude rather
than the form of coercion.
79
73 In its own words, the Court was compelled to interpret "the Amendment . . .
through the narrow window that is appropriate in applying § 241." Id.
74 Id. at 942 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916)).
75 [W]e have no indication that Congress thought that conditions maintained
by means other than by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coer-
cion were 'slavelike.' Whether other conditions are so intolerable that they,
too, should be deemed to be involuntary is a value judgment that we think
is best left for Congress.
Id. at 951.
76 Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined O'Connor's majority opin-
ion; Marshall joined Brennan's concurrence; and Blackmunjoined Stevens' concurrence.
77 Brennan concurred with the result reached by the Court because he agreed that
the test used by the district court was too broad, but he did not agree with the test put forth
by the majority. Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 962 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79 Yet another concurring opinion, filed by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
Blackmun, eschews the use of"hypothetical cases that are not before the Court." Id. at 967
(Stevens, J., concurring). The Stevens concurrence recommends a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach. Id. at 970 (Stevens,J., concurring). Stevens defended case-by-case anal-
ysis, since the majority's special attention to the circumstances of the victim would amount
to this anyway. Id. at 968 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Like Brennan, Stevens found the
limitation of methods of coercion unjustified by either the statute or precedent. "The
statute applies equally to 'physical or mental restraint,' ... and I would not distinguish
between the two kinds of compulsion." Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Chatwin
v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946)) (citation omitted).
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B. The Kozminski Standard Applied in Civil Cases
Regardless of the tenuous support for the majority's rule and the
unique nature of the criminal law requiring such a rule, lower federal
courts frequently use the Kozminski standard in civil cases.80 The use
of the criminal standard in federal tort cases achieves the same effect
as the stringent requirements for bringing civil rights actions under
§ 1985 (3): it limits the availability of a constitutional tort. The appar-
ent ease of application and recent vintage of the Kozminski rule make
it an attractive tool for limiting litigation.81
Courts find the criminal standard especially attractive in cases in-
volving employees challenging restrictions placed upon them by their
employers.82 Remember that in Kozminski, the defendants were found
80 See, e.g., Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding a
county vocational rehabilitation program against attack by a participant who alleged that
the program's requirement of work in exchange for welfare eligibility violated the Thir-
teenth Amendment); Kaveney v. Miller, 1993 WL 298718 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to nul-
lify an agreement whereby plaintiff performed labor for residential hotel in exchange for
credit towards rent because plaintiff's agreement was voluntary under KozminskO.
81 Even before Kozminsk4 courts applied the criminal standard in civil cases. See, e.g.,
Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affid 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Flood, plaintiff
baseball player who took issue with Major League Baseball's league-wide practice obligat-
ing draft picks to play for the first club to choose them (and, if necessary, to play for teams
to which the player may be traded). The court cited a pre-Kozminski criminal case in reach-
ing the conclusion that "inasmuch as plaintiff retains the option not to play baseball at all,
his Thirteenth Amendment argument is foreclosed." 443 F.2d at 268 (citing United States
v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964)). For a discussion of Shackney, see supra note 67.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 710 F. Supp. 271 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that
the Thirteenth Amendment did not invalidate defendant's contract with plaintiff National
Health Service Corps, which loaned him tuition and living expenses for three years of
medical school in exchange for his agreement to serve as a practitioner in an underserved
region for three years after medical school; plaintiff had the option of invoking the con-
tract's payback provision-allowing repayment of the loan at three times the original
amount plus interest instead of serving); Apperson v. Ampad, 641 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (upholding a restrictive covenant that prohibited the plaintiff from working in the
paper goods supply business after leaving the defendant company, since plaintiff could
choose to work in another business altogether); Audet v. Board of Regents, 606 F. Supp.
423 (D.R.I. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs transfer from his position as guidance counselor
to position as science teacher in defendant school was not involuntary servitude, even
though plaintiff attempted to revoke his certification as a science teacher prior to transfer,
plaintiff could find work at another school if he wished to remain a guidance counselor);
Keeler v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1546 (Special Court, Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act 1984) (noting that federal statute's pre-emption of collective bargaining
agreement between rail workers' union and state regulatory committee did not subject
workers to involuntary servitude by depriving them of established method of redressing
hazardous conditions; alternate method of avoiding safety hazards existed, and plaintiffi
were not compelled to stay in their jobs); Cummings v. Virginia Sch. of Cosmetology, 466
F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding no involuntary servitude in the issuance of tuition
credits by defendant school for plaintiffs' performing hairdressing services to those who
agreed to have hair styled by students); Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 217 A.2d 121 (N.J.
1966) (finding that court order requiring barber to cut hair of African-Americans did not




guilty because they deprived their workers of the fundamental option
of leaving. Similarly, the general rule in the employment context is
that "a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be sustained
unless the plaintiff has no option to work elsewhere."83 When employees
feel bound to theirjobs because of social conditions such as poverty or
a tightjob market, courts will not hold employers liable for the "invol-
untariness" that employees perceive. 4 Employment cases focus on
the level and types of control exerted by the employers over their
employees.
Perhaps in an effort to draw a parallel between employment and
education, the Third Circuit Court in Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School
Distric8 5 used Kozminski's criminal standard in its analysis of the plain-
tiffs' claim. As discussed in the introduction of this Note, Steirer in-
volved a suit by high school students Lisa Ann Steirer and David
Moralis against their public high school. The students challenged the
school district's mandatory community service program, which re-
quired each student to perform sixty hours of community service be-
tween the ninth and twelfth grades in order to graduate. 86 Both
Steirer and Moralis believed that volunteerism should be truly volun-
tary and that the program impinged upon their right, guaranteed by
the Thirteenth Amendment, to be free from involuntary servitude.
87
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals agreed with the
students' construction of the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee. The
appellate opinion utilized Kozminski's definition of involuntariness to
determine that the community service was not "coerced."88 Under
this rule, "the critical factor ... is that the victim's only choice is be-
tween performing the labor on the one hand and physical and/or
legal sanctions on the other."8 9
83 Apperson, 641 F. Supp. at 751 (emphasis added).
84 See supra note 82.
85 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa.), affid, 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.
CL 85 (1993).
86 789 F. Supp. at 1338. Too recently to be discussed here, another case denied a
Thirteenth Amendment-based challenged to a high school community service require-
ment. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., No. 94 Civ. 2831, 1995 WL 32016 (S.D.N.Y.Jan.
19, 1995). A third case on this issue is pending. Herdon Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of
Educ., No. 1:94-CV-00196 (M.D.N.C. filed Apr. 19, 1994).
87 In fact, Lisa Ann Steirer claimed that she performed and enjoyed a variety of com-
munity service activities until her high school mandated such work: "I cringe at doing
anything now... I don't get any enjoyment out of it if I'm forced." Lisa Ann Steirer, quoted
in Aaron Epstein, School Service Requirements Debated, DETorr FREE PRESS, Sept. 8, 1993, at
5A. For other articles discussing student reactions to community service requirements, see
Student Balks at School's Forced Community Service, CHI. TmB., Nov. 13, 1994, at 23; Dennis
Kelly, Students Contest Civic Duty Mandates, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1994, at ID.
88 987 F.2d at 998. The court neglected to explain why the criminal rule should be
binding in the civil context, though the parties apparently discussed this issue. 789 F.
Supp. at 1343, n.4.
89 987 F.2d at 999.
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The key to the Steirer decision was the existence of a choice.
Plaintiffs had several options from which to choose, including: at-
tending private school; taking a high school equivalency diploma in
place of graduation; or foregoing high school altogether.90 "The fact
that these choices may not be appealing does not make the required
labor involuntary servitude."91 The court concluded that, as a matter
of law, plaintiffs were not subjected to involuntary servitude by their
required participation in the community service program.
C. Case Law Exceptions to the Thirteenth Arnendment
The use of the Kozminski standard, as illustrated by Steirer, is just
one way courts confront tort claims for involuntary servitude. In the
past, courts have discussed Thirteenth Amendment claims in the fol-
lowing contexts: the military draft;92 civil conscription of able-bodied
men onto road crews;93 sailors' contracts to work on seagoing ves-
sels;9 4 injunctions; 95 taxes;96 and services "attached to land," such as
landlord statutory obligations.97 These are judicially-created excep-
tions to the Thirteenth Amendment. While these situations arguably
involve involuntary servitude, courts have simply declared that the
Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to reach the conduct being
challenged.
These decisions focus on the type of servitude alleged, rather
than whether the service was voluntary, to reach their decisions. In
effect, they limit the facial scope of the Thirteenth Amendment by
placing entire categories of conduct beyond its reach. The rationale
behind the traditional exceptions, when offered, is that the conditions
being litigated were so well-accepted at the time of ratification that the
Framers could not have intended to displace them.98
When courts consider servitudes that did not exist at the time of
ratification, they often employ an analogy to the traditional exceptions.
90 789 F. Supp. at 1344.
91 987 F.2d at 1000.
92 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding United States draft system).
93 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (upholding Florida statute requiring roadwork
from all able-bodied male citizens and punishing noncompliance as a misdemeanor).
94 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (finding that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment does not prohibit criminalizing desertion of a vessel on which sailor is contractually
obligated to work).
95 See Robert S. Stevens, Involuntaty Servitude by Injunction, 6 CoRNELL L.Q. 235 (1921).
96 Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924
(1954).
97 Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) (denying landlord's
Thirteenth Amendment claim against a public emergency statute requiring temporary am-
nesty for holdover tenants).
98 These opinions overlook the irony of their own rationales-an irony that seems
striking when one considers how well-established both slavery and racial prejudice (the
"incidents" of slavery) were in 1865.
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Recent cases have used this rationale to uphold mandatory pro bono
services for indigent criminal defendants99 and incarceration of mate-
rial witnesses in a federal case.100 The argument in these cases con-
sists of enumerating tradition-based precedents and an implied
assertion that the case at hand bears sufficient similarity to the tradi-
tional exceptions to merit exemption from the Amendment's rule.' 01
Sometimes courts create exceptions to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment by citing the public need. These public need exceptions are
similar in nature to the traditional exceptions. In fact, one may re-
gard the traditional exceptions as implicitly relying upon a public
need rationale. 10 2 Public need justifies many servitudes that might
otherwise fall within the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, such as:
compelled child support payment;' 03 pollution-control laws; 104 and
police roadblocks.'
0 5
The public need cases depend upon the public benefit of the
service rendered. One case, Williams v. Arkansas,10 6 held that a police
officer's arrest of a bystander who refused to assist in apprehending a
suspect did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. According to the
Arkansas court, "the responsibilities of a citizen in this republic have
99 Sharp v. Kansas, 783 P.2d 343 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990) (requiring
attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants).
100 In Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973), the Supreme Court rejected the
Thirteenth Amendment claim asserted by a group of illegal immigrants subpoenaed by the
prosecution for the case against their United States employers. Unable to post the bond
required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 46(b), the witnesses were held in prison and
paid one dollar per day until trial. In their separate action the witnesses contested both
the incarceration and the daily rate. The Supreme Court found "no substance" to their
arguments. Id. at 589-90 n.11.
101 See also Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Utah 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
876 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1989) (indicating in dicta that traditional exceptions might cover
community service required of a man in debt to the state agency that cared for his child).
102 See, e.g., Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla.), cert. denied sub noa. Alder v.
Sandstrom, 423 U.S. 1053 (1975) (denying kennel owner's challenge to a court order re-
quiring him to supply greyhounds to racetrack. Although the court cited the traditional
exception for injunctions, one rationale given for the exception was the state's reliance on
parimutuel revenues.).
103 Sep e.g., Knight v. Knight, No. 92-35173, 1993 WL 210667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 473 (1993) (denying plaintiff's claim for an injunction against the Washington State
Attorney General and upholding Washington's child support statute, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.18-.19); Hicks v. Hicks, 387 So.2d 207 (Ala. Civ. App.) writ denied sub nom, Ex Parte
Hicks, 387 So. 2d 209 (Ala. 1980) (upholding award of defendant's property to plaintiff ex-
wife in divorce proceeding).
104 United States v. Tivian Labs, 589 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942
(1979) (upholding federal Water and Air Pollution Prevention and Control Acts against
Thirteenth Amendment attack by chemical company required to produce company
records to Environmental Protection Agency).
105 Boyle v. City of Liberty, 833 F. Supp. 1436 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (stating that public
need justifies roadblock requiring motorists to stop and answer questions; roadblock was
part of effort to capture criminal suspect).
106 490 S.W.2d 117 (Ark. 1973).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
not been so diminished and diluted"10 7 that forced participation in
law enforcement may be seen as involuntary servitude.
Another case, Crews v. Lundquist,l08 justified the service involved
by referring to the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment: the pro-
tection of individual liberty. 10 9 The court interpreted a state statute
that required public administrators to perform uncompensated estate
services for deceased United States war veterans n ° as furthering the
liberty of all citizens by making the government more "effective.""'
The court declared that, as a rule, the Thirteenth Amendment does
not apply to laws requiring citizens to perform services for the benefit
of the state."
2
The focus on the servitude itself and the public need for it distin-
guishes these cases from both the Steirer circuit court opinion and the
criminal cases, which looked at whether the service was involuntary.
The criminal rule does not operate well when a state statute is chal-
lenged because a statute by its nature poses a threat of legal sanction
for non-compliance, thus automatically satisfying Kozminski's involun-
tariness test. Therefore, the cases considering whether a statute im-
poses involuntary servitude necessarily focus on the servitude rather
than the involuntariness.
When courts look to the categorical exceptions described in this
section and find that specific servitudes fall outside the reach of the
Thirteenth Amendment, in reality, they are employing implicit bal-
ancing techniques. Reference to public need illustrates this hidden
balancing. Some courts have utilized an explicit balancing test to de-
termine whether conduct violates the Thirteenth Amendment. Bal-
ancing is more flexible than the Kozminski criminal standard or the
categorical exceptions approach.
D. Balancing Test: A Focus on Servitudes
Several courts have implemented balancing tests to determine
whether specific servitudes should be actionable. These tests vary in
methodology, but most take into account the identity of the plaintiff
and the nature of the service rendered. As with courts analyzing invol-
untary servitude under the Kozminski standard or the traditional ex-
ceptions, courts that use a balancing test attempt to limit recovery to
situations that offend the ascertainable goals of the Thirteenth
107 Id. at 122.
108 197 N.E. 768 (Ill. 1935).
109 Id. at 772.
110 Section 133 of the Administrative Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, para. 135 (Smith-Hurd
1933).
111 197 N.E. at 772.
112 Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff was free to leave his job.
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Amendment. However, rather than attempting to harness the mean-
ing of an intentionally vague constitutional provision within a strict
standard or a narrow exception, these cases present holistic and pol-
icy-based analyses.
Jobson v. Henne13 may well be the progenitor of the balancing
test. This pre-Kozminski case concerned Warren Jobson, who had
spent most of his life as an inmate at the New York State Newark
School for Mental Defectives when, at age forty, he sued the school.
Jobson claimed that the requirement that he perform chores at the
institution constituted involuntary servitude. In determining that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action, the court of appeals did not use
coercion as the touchstone for relief. Rather, "whether an institu-
tion's required program in any given case constitutes involuntary ser-
vitude would seem to depend on the nature of the tasks that are
required of the inmate."" 4 One of the determinative factors for the
Jobson court in analyzing the program was whether it offered any genu-
ine therapeutic value." 5
The Jobson test remains popular in cases concerning mental pa-
tients and juveniles. For example, in Bobilin v. Board of Education," 6
public school students sued a Hawaii school board over mandatory
cafeteria duty. The court determined that less judicial scrutiny is ap-
propriate in the school context than in the mental home context and
proceeded to weigh the competing interests with reference to the
plaintiffs' identities." 7 The Bobilin court balanced the educational
value of the duty required" 8 against the fact that the benefit of the
costs saved by the school was a public rather than private gain.119
The Steirer district court opinion follows the Bobilin balancing
test 120 and comes out, like the circuit court opinion, in favor of the
113 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
114 Id. at 132 n.3.
115 Id. at 131. The fact that the patients' performance of the labor reduced the finan-
cial burden on the State was not really a factor. The court stated that normal housekeep-
ing chores reasonably could be expected of the inmates if they contributed to the inmates'
own upkeep. Id. at 131-32.
116 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975).
117 Because children spend only part of their day in school, while menial patients live
at the hospital, and because parents and other adults are more likely to intervene on be-
half of childrens' rights, the court afforded greater deference to the school's defense of
their program. The court also noted the existence of legislative and administrative bodies
concerned with regulating school programs and implied deference to these bodies. Id. at
1100.
118 Id. at 1098-99. The importance of this factor appears to be that education is a
traditional exception to the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 1103-04.
119 Id. at 1104. The public benefit factor relates this test to the "public need" excep-
tions cases. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
120 789 F. Supp. at 1345 ("The Court concludes that the reasoning of Bobilin is persua-
sive."). However, on appeal, the circuit court considered Bobilin's test but was "unpre-
pared, at least at this time, to accept the proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment is
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defendant school district. The court interpreted the term "involun-
tary servitude" in light of "the realities of modem life," 121 pointing out
that "the contours of slavery have shifted since the enactment of the
Thirteenth Amendment." 122 The court's application of the test asked
whether the plaintiff performed the type of service reachable under
the Amendment and found that under the Bobilin's factors the service
involved in this case was not "servitude" under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.12 3 Key factors included the educational value of the commu-
nity service program 2 4 and the public benefit it conferred. 2 5
In a case in which mental patients contested an institutional work
program, Weidenfeller v. Kidulis,12 6 the district court bifurcated its in-
quiry with a test that looked at involuntariness as well as the servitude
involved. The court considered first whether there was coercion in-
volved, and then whether the state interest in and therapeutic value of
the program overcame the burden it imposed on the patients.
12 7
The more common balancing test focuses only on the servitude.
King v. Carey,128 a case in which juveniles civilly committed to a youth
rehabilitation center challenged the center's work program, balanced
the "therapeutic and cost-saving purposes" against any excessive or
non-therapeutic aspects of the program. 129
When courts use a balancing test to determine whether a servi-
tude falls within the intended reach of the Thirteenth Amendment,
many question whether the service required is "akin to African slav-
ery."' 30 For example, in United States v. Bertoli,13 ' the Third Circuit
upheld a district court order requiring a law firm to provide "standby
services" to a former client who had decided to continue his case pro
inapplicable merely because the mandatory service requirement provides a public benefit
by saving taxpayers money." 987 F.2d at 998. In fact, the public benefit is only a small part
of the Bobilin test.
121 789 F. Supp. at 1342 (citing United States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391, 1401 (W.D.
Mich. 1986)).
122 Id.
123 Id at 1343.
124 Id at 1345.
125 Id. A more recent case considering whether community service requirements im-
pose involuntary servitude applied both the balancing text and Kozminski to deny the plain-
tiffs' claim. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., No. 94 Civ. 2831, 1995 WL 32016, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995).
126 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
127 Id. at 450.
128 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
129 Id. at 44 (quotingJobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966)). Because the
plaintiffs in Kingwere not criminally convicted according to the requirements of due pro-
cess, id., they did not fall into the Amendment's built-in exception of "punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII.
130 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 832 (1916). Kozminski also adopted this description of
the Amendment's reach. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
131 994 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1993).
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se. There, the court adopted a "contextual" approach to find that the
service rendered "does not evoke in our minds the burdens endured
by the African slaves in the cotton fields or kitchens of the antebellum
south.' 3 2 The court in Jane L. v. Bangerter'33 ruled against a plaintiff
who challenged Utah's restrictive abortion law by claiming that the
limited availability of abortion services effectively forced her to carry
her child to term, thus imposing involuntary servitude. The Jane L.
court also compared the labor involved to African slavery and found
that the Thirteenth Amendment analogy in this situation "strains
credulity."
i3 4
Reference to the servitude involved implicates an important as-
pect of the Thirteenth Amendment: its labor vision. Cases that con-
strue "servitude" situate the Amendment's purpose first among
relevant factors.' 35 Rather than emphasizing the methods used by a
particular defendant to secure the plaintiff's services, these cases ana-
lyze the plaintiff's situation with reference to the specific degradations
that servitude implies. United States v. Shackney,13 6 a pre-Kozminski
criminal case, described the Amendment's primary purpose as the
elimination of "practices whereby subjection having some of the inci-
dents of slavery was legally enforced." 137 Another case, Bailey v. Ala-
bama,138 described the Amendment as "a charter of universal civil
freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the
flag.'139
132 Id. at 1022.
133 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992).
134 Id. at 1549. In a traditionalist argument, the court noted that abortion was illegal
in most enacting states when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865. Id, at 1548.
The court also cited Kozminskis involuntariness rule in its comment that the women chal-
lenging the law were free to travel to other states to obtain abortions. Id. at 1549 n.16.
Although this court saw no merit in the plaintiff's claim that restrictions on the right to
control one's reproductive system violates the prohibition of involuntary servitude, some
scholars have adopted the plaintiff's argument. See, e.g., Andrew Koppeman, Forced Labor
A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L REv. 480 (1990).
135 Another reason for the focus on servitudes in traditional exception, public need,
and balancing cases is that many of these cases challenged statutes, which by definition
pose a threat of legal sanction. If courts used the criminal standard to analyze challenges
to statutes, the statutes often, but not always, would be found to violate the Thirteenth
Amendment on this basis. Unable to rely on the criminal standard to deny a claim, courts
turn instead to rationales such as traditionalism or public need and necessarily look at the
servitude imposed.
136 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964). For a discussion of the facts of Shachney, see supra note
67.
137 Id. at 485. This description seems to equate involuntary servitude with badges of
slavery. Interestingly, Shackney attributed to Congress the same freedom in defining the
reach of the Thirteenth Amendment that the badges of servitude cases do: "Whether or
not the Thirteenth Amendment would permit passing this line, we are not convinced Con-
gress has done so." Id. at 487.
138 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
139 Id. at 241.
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The balancing test responds to these definitions. The Jobson-
Bobilin test uses factors that highlight specific aspects of the slave expe-
rience, such as private economic benefit flowing from the labor,
140
absence of therapeutic benefit to the laborer,141 and the physical de-
mands and conditions of the labor.142 The analyses in Bertoli and
Bangerter take a less structured approach, looking at whether the com-
plainant suffered a loss of personal freedom of the type suffered by
the slaves. The next section explores how the different standards for
involuntary servitude relate to the Amendment's purpose and how




A. A Variety of Devices Limits Constitutional Torts
The preceding survey of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence
depicts a variety of devices rather than a consistent methodology for
denying civil causes of action. The dichotomy between the first and
second sections of the Thirteenth Amendment limits litigation by re-
serving for Congress the job of determining exactly what conduct is
prohibited by the Amendment in addition to actual slaveholding.
The stringent requirements for accessing the federal tort statutes also
limit Thirteenth Amendment litigation. A plaintiff who is able to sur-
pass these obstacles and bring a claim for an alleged Thirteenth
Amendment violation must then confront the categorical exceptions,
which limit the substantive reach of the Amendment. If a court does
not apply one of the exceptions, it can either perform the balancing
test or apply the criminal standard. A court deciding an involuntary
servitude case should choose the former: a uniform balancing test is
more suitable to civil cases than the criminal standard.
B. The Criminal Rule Should Not Apply in Civil Cases
The Steirer circuit court opinion is significant in that it may repre-
sent the entrenchment of the Kozminski criminal standard in civil
cases. The rule of Kozminski may be necessary in criminal cases be-
cause due process requires a rule that focuses on the defendant's con-
140 Bobilin v. Board of Educ., 403 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (D. Haw. 1975).
141 King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
142 Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966).
143 An interesting postscript to this section on the importance of "servitude" is the case
of NewJersey v. Marchand, 545 A.2d 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988). The case involved the
prosecution of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent who kidnapped a suspect's girlfriend
and held her captive for several hours in an effort to get information about the suspect's
whereabouts. The court found the state's criminal involuntary servitude statute to be inap-
plicable because there was no service or labor at all. Id. at 821 (applying N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:13-2(2) (West 1982)).
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duct and provides adequate notice of prosecutable conduct.
Furthermore, Kozminski seems destined to remain the rule in the crim-
inal context, since the Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule its recent
Kozminski decision. However, courts trying civil cases are not bound to
follow Kozminski and should read before they sign.
The primary reason why Kozminski should not apply to civil cases
is that, by its own terms, its holding is limited to the statutory construc-
tion of the criminal statutes involved, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1584.144
The Kozminski court was defining involuntary servitude "through the
narrow window that is appropriate in applying § 241." 145 In its con-
struction of § 1584, the Court focused not on the history of the Thir-
teenth Amendment but on the history of § 1584's statutory
precursors.146 These federal criminal laws took into account a variety
of factors not relevant to either the construction of the constitutional
amendment or the wisdom of a private cause of action. Tort cases
should not look to Kozminski's analysis of the reach of these criminal
statutes in order to discover the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
A second reason for courts in civil cases to bypass the criminal
rule is that Kozminski's central rationale was the need for clarity and
notice in the criminal context. The Court interpreted and applied
the relevant statutes by considering the requirements of due pro-
cess.147 In fact, Kozminski is cited most often for its espousal of a clear
rule in criminal cases, not for its involuntariness test.148 The narrow
scope of the Kozminski rule thus supports the confinement of its stan-
dard to prosecutions for criminal involuntary servitude.
In addition, Kozminskis rule is unpersuasive because of the spe-
cial difficulties it presents in tort cases. Kozminski's most glaring prob-
lem is that it purports to provide a bright-line rule, but nevertheless
carves out a broad exception for cases in which the victim is a child or
suffers from mental disability. When the victim is especially vulnera-
ble, as in these cases, the involuntariness standard shifts its focus from
144 The Kozminski court cited "sound principles of statutory construction" as the rationale
for its definition of involuntary servitude. 487 U.S. at 951 (emphasis added). See supra
note 69 for a discussion of these statutes.
145 Id. at 944.
146 According to the Kozminski opinion, § 1584 was based in part on the Slave Trade
statute, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 423 (1940) (criminalizing participation in the slave market),
and in part on the Padrone statute, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 446 (1940) (prohibiting the ex-
ploitative trade in young Italian boys as "apprentices"). Id. at 945-48.
147 Id. at 949-52.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); United
States v. Waitt, 761 F. Supp. 108, 109 (D. Kan.), vacated, 1991 WL 261710 (D. Kan. 1991);
NewJersey v. Dixon, 553 A.2d 1, 4 (NJ. 1988). According to these and other cases,,Kozmin-
ski stands for the proposition that "criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."
Dixon, 553 A.2d at 4.
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the defendant's actions to the victim's state of mind.149 Ironically, it is
precisely a focus on the victim's state of mind that the Kozminski ma-
jority saw as violative of due process.150 As Kozminskis concurringJus-
tices pointed out, this caveat could convert the majority standard into
a case-by-case rule. 151 Because courts often will be forced to engage in
case-by-case analysis anyway, a test designed for the civil context is
more appropriate.
Kozminski also presents special problems in civil cases as a result
of its focus on the method of coercion utilized rather than on the
servitude imposed. A second look at the balancing cases, Jobson v.
Henne and Bobilin v. Board of Education, illustrates this point. As dis-
cussed above, Jobson found that a cause of action would lie for mental
patients forced to perform unreasonable amounts of labor, while
Bobilin found no cause of action arising from the routine cafeteria
duty imposed on grade schoolers. The courts looked at the duties and
inquired whether they were reasonable. Contextual details, such as
the nature of the duties and their value to the plaintiffs, guided the
courts in determining whether the claims should be heard. If the
courts instead had followed Kozminski, their deliberations would have
focused on whether the institution's administrators threatened the pa-
tients or children with physical abuse or legal sanction. The fact that
the mental patients could go to a private institution and that the chil-
dren could attend private school would counsel strongly against the
existence of a claim in either case. It would not matter how many
hours per day the plaintiffs worked or whether the work benefitted
the plaintiffs. This focus seems counterintuitive. An observer would
surely see the conditions imposed as determinative and reach the
same conclusions as the courts-that cafeteria duty is an acceptable
part of the school curriculum but that forcing residential mental pa-
tients to perform maintenance chores may be unreasonable.
149 487 U.S. at 948. Note that in several of the cases discussed herein, such as Steirer,
Jobson, Bobilin Weidenfeller, and King, the plaintiffs were either juveniles or mentally dis-
abled persons. All of these cases, excluding the appellate opinion in Steirer, adopted a
balancing test. Perhaps the courts' choices were motivated by the fact that the Kozminski
standard would not have been as useful in light of its exception based on the special attrib-
utes of the plaintiff.
150 [A]s the Government would interpret the statutes, the type of coercion pro-
hibited would depend entirely upon the victim's state of mind. Under such
a view, the statutes would provide almost no objective indication of the con-
duct or condition they prohibit, and thus would fail to provide fair notice to
ordinary people who are required to conform their conduct to the law.
487 U.S. at 949-50.
151 See supra note 73. Such a standard is found also in rape law, in which criminal
liability depends upon the victim's perception of the use or threatened use of force as well
as the defendant's perception of consent, and consent may depend upon factors such as
the age of the victim and whether the victim is married to the defendant.
400 [Vol. 80:372
NOTE-UNLUCKY THIRTEENTH
The final problem with the Kozminski rule is that its focus on vol-
untariness shortchanges the purpose and ambitions of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Kozminski approach mirrors contract methodolo-
gies, which probe the respective bargaining positions of players in a
private exchange system but generally do not look at the substantive
content of their dealings. In order for contract-based exchange sys-
tems to function efficiently, the participants must possess sufficient
bargaining power to influence the market. A market model of the
Thirteenth Amendment operates the same way, for "[wihen the
master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go
on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to re-
lieve ... unwholesome conditions of work."15 2 Voluntariness is essen-
tial to a properly-functioning market, in which employers seek the
best workers and the best workers seek the fairest and most rewarding
employers. 153 Kozminsk's restrained interpretation of "involuntary
servitude" follows this market model by using coercion as its
touchstone.
The Kozminski standard may collapse the phrase "involuntary ser-
vitude" into the single criterion of involuntariness because it presup-
poses a view of "servitude" that is confined to that used in the market
model for contracts cases.'5 4 That is, only labor with an established
market value qualifies for Thirteenth Amendment protection. This
characterization of "servitude" reflects an idea espoused by many of
the Amendment's framers, 1' 5 who envisioned notjust freedom for the
slaves but, prospectively, a genuinely free market for labor. 56 The
Thirteenth Amendment provides the opportunity for every citizen "to
till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow and to enjoy the
152 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
153 As one court put it, "the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working condi-
tions, or treatment is the right to change employers." Audet v. Board of Regents, 606 F.
Supp. 423, 433 (D.R.I. 1985).
154 Kozminski epitomizes the view that "[t]he essence of slavery or involuntary servitude
is that the worker must labor against his will for the benefit of another." Beltran v. Cohen,
303 F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (holding that a levy on a taxpayer's wages to pay
back taxes is not involuntary servitude; the taxpayer had the option of quitting her job).
155 See Lea S. Vanderwelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L
Rxv. 437, 453 (1989) (After abolition, "the entire spectrum of debate changed, as bondage
dropped from view and the focus shifted to labor autonomy, the positive object."); ten-
Broek, supra note 16, at 176-83.
156 Some Civil War era politicians complained that slavery impeded interstate com-
merce by creating different labor markets in slave and non-slave states. "Slavery was essen-
tiaily a monopoly of labor, and as such locked the states where it prevailed against the
incoming of free industry. Where labor was the property of the capitalist, the white man
was excluded from employment." Letter from President Andrew Johnson to Congress
(Dec. 4, 1865), quoted in G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal Histoy of the
Thirteenth Amendment (pt. 1), 12 Hous. L. Rxv. 1, 5 (1974).
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rewards of his own labor." 57 Thus, under this view, the Thirteenth
Amendment is a constitutional mandate for paid, voluntary labor. 15 8
The Kozminski standard works in labor cases, such as those involv-
ing migrant worker camps and employment contracts. 159 In these
cases, courts can focus on voluntariness because the "servitude" is la-
bor carrying a market value. 160 In a sense, the servitude already
matches Kozminski's vision. Furthermore, Kozminski's contracts model
serves well in the criminal context because defendants generally are
private actors whose power over their victims can be assessed in terms
of bargaining position. However, criminal and employment cases do
not define the entire spectrum of Thirteenth Amendment applica-
tions; the blanket use of the Kozminski standard in all Thirteenth
Amendment cases would be unduly confining as it would preclude
Thirteenth Amendment protection for personal freedoms not carry-
ing market value. For persons traditionally excluded from positions
of power in the marketplace and in situations that do not follow pat-
terns of bargaining, Thirteenth Amendment doctrine must take a
more flexible approach.
C. The Correct Standard Should Focus on Servitude
The Kozminski definition of involuntary servitude presents a nar-
row view of the Thirteenth Amendment's purpose and effect. Analysis
of the servitude involved, rather than of whether the service was co-
erced according to a narrow criminal standard, forces courts to con-
front the Thirteenth Amendment's broader significance. Rather than
presupposing a market model, as under the Kozminski rule, courts in-
stead may look to the attributes of the institution of slavery to give
meaning to the term "involuntary servitude." Only by delving into the
effects of slavery on personal liberty can courts appreciate the breadth
of the liberty assured by the constitutional Amendment that abolished
slavery.
The categorical exception cases and the balancing cases look at
servitudes. The use of the categorical exceptions is unfortunate, how-
ever, because it goes against the plain meaning of the Thirteenth
157 Rep. E.C. Ingersoll of Illinois. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989-90 (1864).
158 The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment was "to make labor free, by prohibit-
ing that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for
another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude." Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
159 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 315 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding no
involuntary servitude on part of student who performed odd jobs for school officials in
order to fund the abortion they urged his girlfriend to obtain; even if the school officials
influenced the girl enough to obtain the abortion, this did not render involuntary the
labor performed to pay for the abortion).
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Amendment, thus alienating the text from its accepted legal meaning.
It effectively rewrites the Amendment without a genuine rationale.
The idea that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to reach
certain conduct that was traditional at the time the Amendment was
drafted is almost humorous. As two commentators quite aptly put it,
"the Amendment was designed to challenge long-standing institutions
and practices that violated its core values of personhood and dignity.
Any exception to the Amendment's reach must be limited to those
historic practices that are consistent with the Amendment's central
thrust."1
61
The exception cases are more plausible when they invoke public
need as a rationale, for then the carving out of exceptions is actually
covert balancing. For example, the case finding that conscription of
civilians onto road crews does not impose involuntary servitude
162
could hardly have found that the labor was voluntary. Instead, the
Court decided that the specific form of labor required was acceptable
under the Thirteenth Amendment. Finding the labor to be outside
the scope of the Constitution is a daring example of judicial legisla-
tion and hardly seems justified. The only meaningful explanation for
this rule is that the service required was permissible when the public
need was balanced against the personal liberty promised by the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Ostensibly, the Court would not have been will-
ing to uphold a law that required conscripted civilians to run in the
Boston Marathon. Such a servitude would be unreasonable.
The balancing test, with its attention to where the benefit flows,
the value of the work to the plaintiff, and the nature of the work in-
volved, explains the meaning of servitude in more detail. It reaches
rational results without the aid of inappropriate criminal rules orjudi-
cial alteration of the Amendment's scope. Furthermore, the balanc-
ing test takes a more complete look at the Thirteenth Amendment
than does Kozminski. The slave experience encompassed more than
the lack of bargaining power in the labor market: slaves endured sex-
ual and reproductive exploitation, 163 legalized physical abuse, 164 and
the loss of personal autonomy in all aspects of their lives. These non-
market servitudes are recognized by the balancing test.
One might argue that the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment
did not intend non-market servitudes to fall within its reach. How-
161 Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thir-
teenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1374 (1992).
162 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
163 See Joyce E. McConnell, Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth
Amendment 4YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992);Judith K. Shafer, Sexual Cruelty to Slaves: The
Unreported Case of Humphrey v. Utz, 68 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 1313 (1993); Katyal, supra note
38.
164 Amar & Widawsky, supra note 161.
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ever, the framers acknowledged such harms in their conception of
freedom from slavery. Ratification-era opinions predicted that the
Thirteenth Amendment would "bring the Constitution into avowed
harmony with the Declaration of Independence" 165 and provide "an
express guarantee of personal liberty and an express prohibition
against its invasion anywhere." 166 In the years following ratification,
Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court outspokenly supported a con-
struction of the Thirteenth Amendment that would reflect its framers'
concept of undiluted rights. In his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases,
167
Justice Harlan criticized the majority's restrictive view of the Amend-
ment's scope: "My brethren admit that [the Amendment] established
and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United States. But
did the freedom thus established involve nothing more than exemp-
tion from actual slavery? Was nothing more intended than to forbid
one man from owning another as property?" 168
Today, several commentators argue for expansive views of the
Amendment. For example, Professor Akhil Reed Amar espouses a
view of the Thirteenth Amendment as a guarantee of "minimal enti-
tlements"169 such as food and shelter, on the model of the Freedman's
Bureau promise of "forty acres and a mule."170 Other writers have
suggested the Thirteenth Amendment as: an express justification for
the right to an abortion;171 a tool to punish domestic violence; 172 a
cause of action against police departments that refuse to prosecute
pimps for forced prostitution; 73 and a mandate for state service agen-
cies to protect the children they have treated from later abuse.'7 4
165 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865), quoted in tenBroek, supra note 16, at
179.
166 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480-81 (1864), quoted in Buchanan, supra note
156, at 13.
167 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
168 Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
169 Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theoy of Minimal Entitlements,
10 H v. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 37 (1990).
170 Id. at 39. Amar's thesis depends on the proposition that democracy will not work
unless each voting citizen has a stake in the system, and that minimal entitlement to prop-
erty guarantees such a stake. Slavery purposely disenfranchised and disempowered those
who lacked an economic stake in the system because power is dangerous in the hands of
those who have no economic incentive to preserve the status quo. Id. at 38.
171 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 480 (1990).
172 See McConnell, supra note 163.
173 See Katyal, supra note 38. See also Charles H.Jones,Jr., An Argumentfor Federal Protec-
tion Against Racially Motivated Crimes, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 689, 705-33 (1986) (pro-
posing the use of the Thirteenth Amendment and its criminal implementing statutes to
punish hate crimes).
174 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 161.
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D. The Badges of Slavery Should Not Swallow Up Involuntary
Servitude
As discussed in Parts I.B and C, the "badges of slavery" are those
forms of discrimination that Congress can prohibit through legisla-
tion, pursuant to the second section of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.' 75 Since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. interprets this second
section as a virtual blank check for Congress, 176 the badges of slavery
are potentially a source of expansive individual liberty. However, this
freedom is not available to individuals in the absence of specific legis-
lation. Conduct that Congress could target as violative of the Thir-
teenth Amendment may not be so defined by individual litigants in
civil rights cases. 1
77
Commentators who support innovative applications of the Thir-
teenth Amendment call for more expansive definitions of involuntary
servitude in the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment.178 Based
on the text and legislative history of the Amendment and studies of
life under slavery, they find several harms of modem life-such as
prostitution or continuous abuse-to be like slavery or actual slavery,
and thus directly violative of the Amendment. 79 They do not call for
congressional legislation, under the Amendment's second section, to
remedy these harms; they do not, as the courts have, see legislative
enforcement as the only way to expand the Amendment's scope.
By contrast, cases such as the Steirer circuit court opinion refuse to
apply the Thirteenth Amendment's first section to conduct that does
not fit the narrow Kozminski standard for involuntary servitude. The
Amendment's potential for vast civil reform has been relegated to the
second section's grant of enforcement power to Congress. Thus, the
reigning judicial definition of involuntary servitude departs drastically
from the expansive definition lurking within the phrase "badges of
slavery." A more reasoned interpretation of the Amendment would
confine the Kozminski model of involuntary servitude to the criminal
statutes and place the constitutional right to be free from involuntary
servitude along a continuum with the flexible badges of slavery.
This Note argues for the use of a balancing test for Thirteenth
Amendment civil claims. This test emphasizes not involuntariness but
servitude, thus allowing a broader interpretation of the types of con-
duct reachable under the Amendment. This approach situates invol-
175 See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
176 Courts may test legislative enactments under the Amendment with a standard simi-
lar to that used for the Commerce Clause: the statute must be rationally related to the
prohibition of slavery. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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untary servitude and the badges of slavery on a continuum. The
former characterizes situations that are like slavery, such as the inva-
sive and exploitative use of another's body. The latter should desig-
nate the forces and conduct often used to reinforce slavery or recreate
its effects, such as devices that allow attorneys to strike minorities from
juries °80 and arbitrary job requirements that prevent targeted groups
from obtaining valuable employment. Alternatively, one might view
slavery and involuntary servitude as the core of the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition, with the badges of slavery forming a penum-
bra in which only Congress may operate.
An over-expansive interpretation of involuntary servitude could
upset this structure and transform the Thirteenth Amendment into a
source of substantive due process rights enforceable against individu-
als. However, courts now engage in too sparing an interpretation of
involuntary servitude, leaving too much of the work of enforcing the
Constitution to Congress' discretion. To borrow from one writer, the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude repre-
sents an "underenforced constitutional norm."181 That is, judicial ap-
plications of the doctrine draw not on the logical boundaries of the
language but on notions of federalism and institutional settlement. 182
Furthermore, this doctrine leaves the definition of constitutional free-
doms to the majoritarian process.
Illustrative of the usefulness of a broader view of involuntary servi-
tude is the case challenging a Utah law restricting women's abortion
rights. In Jane L. v. Bangerter,83 the district court scoffed at the idea
that lack of reproductive choice makes women "akin to African
slave [s]."184 In asserting that preventing women from choosing not to
bear children does not make them like slaves, the court ignored the
180 See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibi-
tion Against the Racial Use of Peremptoiy Challenges, 76 CoRNw. L. REv. 1 (1990).
181 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 H.uv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
182 Sager described the underenforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause as occasioned by considerations similar to those of statutory
construction:
Where a federal judicial construct is found not to extend to certain official
behavior because of institutional concerns rather than analytical percep-
tions, it seems strange to regard the resulting decision as a statement about
the meaning of the constitutional norm in question. After all, what the
members of the federal tribunal have actually determined is that there are
good reasons for stopping short of exhausting the content of the constitu-
tional concept with which they are dealing; the limited judicial construct
which they have fashioned or accepted is occasioned by this determination
and does not derive from ajudgment about the scope of the constitutional
concept itself.
Id. at 1221.
188 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992). See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
184 Id. at 1549.
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fact that the breeding and rape of female slaves were established ele-
ments of the slave system.' 8 5 Perhaps the court meant only that the
Thirteenth Amendment's ratifiers did not have this specific situation
in mind. After all, a nineteenth-century, exclusively-male Congress
could hardly have been expected to be motivated by exclusively-fe-
male concerns such as reproductive choice. Nonetheless, a view of
the Thirteenth Amendment that ignores the experiences of women
under slavery is unworkably narrow.
86
The position taken by the plaintiff in Jane L. is strengthened by
the fact that the ratifiers did foresee the extension of the Amend-
ment's protections to women. One senator perceptively noted that,
after ratification, "I suppose before the law a woman would be equal
to a man, would be as free as a man. A wife would be equal to her
husband and as free as her husband before the law."' 87 Whether such
a notion was palatable to every man in the room is a separate issue
from whether the legislative history of the Amendment supports its
application to servitudes beyond the market model.
E. A Proposal for a New Standard
The narrow interpretation of involuntary servitude and subse-
quent delegation to Congress of the real power under the Amend-
ment weakens what might otherwise be a potent right of recourse.
The Amendment's inclusion of private conduct within its prohibition
gives rise to the fear that an expansive definition of involuntary servi-
tude will create a broad basis for federal jurisdiction over ordinary tort
actions. 188 As a result, courts ignore the purpose and language of the
Amendment and look to a chaotic mix of devices to limit litigation.
These devices, such as the categorical exceptions and the use of the
185 See McConnell, supra note 163, at 218-20.
186 Even if Congress explicitly rejected the idea that the Amendment would reach the
uniquely damaging aspect of slavery for women as a class, such a limitation on the charter
of freedom could not stand up to current equal protection norms. The prospective and
intentionally-vague wording of the Thirteenth Amendment assures its continuing rele-
vance and consciously permits evolutive interpretations. See Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves
Author the Thirteenth Amendment? An Essay in Redemptive Histo", 5 YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 471,
493 (1993) ("Legal interpretation is not an alternative to majority will, but a means equally
indispensable to enforcing majority will or resisting it."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STA 'N. L. Rnv. 321, 375-78 (1990)
(criticizing Kozminski's statutory interpretation and proposing "the case-by-case evolution
of the statute to meet new problems and societal circumstances, and to meet new under-
standings of those problems and circumstances.").
187 Buchanan, supra note 156, at 9 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488
(1864) (statement of Senator Howard)).
188 See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 374 (DR.I. 1978) (imply-




criminal standard in civil cases, rob the Thirteenth Amendment of
much of its force.
Rather than use artificial methods to limit the scope of the consti-
tutional text, courts should rely on the statutes implementing the
Amendment to ensure that litigation under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment does not spiral out of control. This Note proposes expanding
the definition of involuntary servitude while leaving in place the statu-
tory hurdles to bringing a tort claim against a private actor. Under
the proposed system, plaintiffs would be better able to obtain relief
against state practices that violate the liberty ensured by the Thir-
teenth Amendment, but the adjudication of ordinary dignitary wrongs
would continue to be under state laws.
1. Federal Tort Claims
A strong test for civil actions under the Thirteenth Amendment
discerns those claims worthy of protection without unduly limiting the
reach of the Amendment. Specifically, the requirement of a class-
based motivation on the part of the defendant distinguishes constitu-
tional torts from those that should be left to state law. 189 When a de-
fendant imposes involuntary servitude upon a plaintiff, the initial
determination that the defendant's motivation consisted of class prej-
udice against the plaintiff should suffice to bring the claim within
reach of the federal law. Once this is established, the plaintiff will
have stated a claim even if Congress has not targeted the specific con-
duct involved.190
2. Challenges to State Laws
A broad definition of involuntary servitude would ease the bur-
den on plaintiffs who challenge state laws that threaten the liberty as-
sured by the Amendment. When plaintiffs sue state agencies, as in
Steirer or Jane L., courts should engage in greater scrutiny of the chal-
lenged programs. The real usefulness of a more potent Thirteenth
189 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. This author agrees with the proposi-
tion in Jennifer Grace Redmond, Note, Redefining Race in St. Francis College v. Ali-Khazraji
and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 42 VA'ro. L. REv. 209, 213 (1989) (supporting current doctrine that sees the classifica-
tions relevant to discrimination law in terms of sociopolitical affiliation rather than
biology).
190 According to one interpretation, Thirteenth Amendment actions yield only injunc-
tions, habeas corpus writs, or declaratory judgments, not money damages. See Bayh v. Son-
nenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 411 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1170 (1992) (not
apparent that Thirteenth Amendment would support an action for damages). This further
erodes the idea that adjudication of Thirteenth Amendment claims will result in an erup-
tion of federal tort claims.
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Amendment may well be as an explicit source of the type of liberties
previously attributed to "privacy."1' 1
One obstacle to using the involuntary servitude doctrine as a limi-
tation on state action is the enduring criticism of any broadening of
federal power. This argument fails, however, because it is a criticism
of the Thirteenth Amendment itself. The Reconstruction Amend-
ments, 192 when taken as a whole, indicate a federally-centered scheme
of government intentionally appropriating much of the power previ-
ously accorded to the states. 193 Using the federal courts as fora to test
state action against a generous standard of liberty furthers, rather
than violates, the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment. At the time
the Thirteenth Amendment was passed, the invalidity of all laws and
private practices threatening personal freedom was recognized as part
and parcel of the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude. 94 Thus,
the potent threat to autonomy posed by a state law restricting individ-
ual choices is just the sort of action that the Thirteenth Amendment
condemns.
3. Elimination of the Criminal Standard in Civil Cases
Kozminski's standard applies only to criminal statutes. The dis-
tinction between "physical and legal" as opposed to "psychological"
coercion is difficult to apply in any context, but is undeniably the law
in criminal cases. However, civil cases should enjoy a more realistic
assessment of the coercive measures actually used by slaveowners to
impose involuntary servitude. These measures include "splitting fami-
191 See Koppelman, supra note 134, at 483. See also TRME, supra note 14, § 15-10, at
1354 ("A right to terminate one's pregnancy might.., be seen more plausibly as a matter
of resisting sexual and economic domination than as a matter of shielding 'private' transac-
tions between patients and physicians from public control."). The Thirteenth Amendment
also might support the freedom to engage in homosexual acts, since restricting an individ-
ual's sexuality effects a deprivation of self-determination like that imposed on the slaves.
The application of the balancing test would dispense with the argument that the State has
an interest in preventing such behavior, as the State's interest would receive less deferen-
tial treatment than under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 196 (1986) (declining to strike state law criminalizing sodomy). Furthermore, the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on interference with personal liberty is more appli-
cable than "privacy" to issues of personal autonomy and familial intimacy. See id. at 191
(finding that the privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clause do not cover sexual
conduct between consenting adults because there is "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other").
192 U.S. CoNsr. amends. XIII-XV.
193 One of the most vehement objections to the passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was that it "constituted an unwarrantable extension of the power of the central gov-
ernment." Buchanan, supra note 156, at 8.
194 The Thirteenth Amendment "vindicate[s] those fundamental rights which apper-
tain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes




lies, removing children, controlling food, water, and medical care,
movement, formal education, religion, and family affiliation." 195 At-
tention to these methods makes the Thirteenth Amendment applica-
ble in a variety of areas currently suffering from a lack of legal
intervention, such as domestic abuse and prostitution. The Kozminski
standard ignores these modem problems because it takes a narrow
view of the Thirteenth Amendment. By eschewing use of this criminal
rule in civil cases, courts could escape the limitation of Kozminski's
market-based definition of servitude and instead respond to commen-
tators who call for an updated definition of personal liberty.1 96
4. The Balancing Test
The optimal construction of the Thirteenth Amendment would
adopt the balancing test in all civil rights cases. Courts should analyze
the servitude involved by comparing it to the types of servitude im-
posed upon human slaves. Relevant questions include: Who benefits?
What sort of work is performed? What value does the work hold for
the person performing it? In considering the specific servitude in-
volved, courts must ask whether the work is "akin to" slavery or an-
other arbitrary or class-based form; such an approach broadens the
definition of liberty mandated by the Thirteenth Amendment. In
cases against private defendants, courts also should consider the ex-
tent to which the plaintiff was deprived of autonomy, that is, the invol-
untariness. The methods of coercion employed will be key evidence
of this. In cases against government defendants, courts should bal-
ance the servitude against a compelling public need. In these cases,
involuntariness will be established by the potential sanction of the law
contested.
In many of the cases discussed herein, application of the balanc-
ing test would reach the same result as another method. The Steirer
195 McConnell, supra note 163, at 220. See also Ann Penners Wrosch, Comment, Undue
Influence, Involuntary Servitude and Brainwashing. A More Consistent, Interest-Based Approach,
25 Loy. L. L. REv. 499, 499-500 (1992) (defining coercive persuasion as any coercive
measure that causes harm and proposing a balance between the degree of autonomy lost
and the benefit or harm to the self or society, harmful coercion may result from a physical
threat on a short-term basis or psychological coercion on a long-term basis).
196 One commentator sees the failure of courts to define expansively the Thirteenth
Amendment's force as a result of our society's inability to see law from the perspective of
the victim or "other":
Seeing politics as inherently "difficult" for law to assimilate, constitutional
theory has ignored the particular difficulty within our politics posed by the
absorption of slaves into the polity that enslaved them. By denying that the
past could ever speak persuasively to the present, constitutional theory has
succeeded in maintaining a discreet silence about the... "original history"
that makes our society's race relations record so singularly lacking in moral
authority.
Binder, supra note 186, at 497.
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district and circuit courts both found for the defendant school dis-
trict, although one used the balancing test and the other followed Koz-
minski. The categorical exception cases, with their suggestion of
implicit balancing, also reach logical results. For example, drafters of
the Thirteenth Amendment decidedly did not intend to eliminate
military conscription. A balancing approach to such matters of na-
tional security would reach the same conclusion as the traditional ex-
ception rationale.
There are several benefits, however, to a unified balancing test. A
single standard offers simplicity and doctrinal integrity. Potential
plaintiffs will be better able to assess their chances of success than is
possible under the current scheme. Courts may dispose of cases more
efficiently by simply applying the test rather than citing a litany of
cases that all follow different tests and attempting to draw compari-
sons between them.197 The balancing test is a stronger tool than Koz-
minski against oppressive private conduct because it applies to
servitudes other than conventional labor and to methods of coercion
other than violence or legal sanction. However, the requirement of a
discriminatory motive distinguishes the balancing test from state law
torts. Finally, the balancing test protects against a wider variety of
state laws than Kozminski because it takes a broader view of the mean-
ing of personal autonomy.
CONCLUSION
The Steirer circuit court collapsed "involuntary" and "servitude"
into a single word, "involuntariness," rather than giving significance to
each part.198 It did this because the criminal standard it applied looks
only at the method of coercion. This criminal standard utilizes an
unduly narrow model of servitude and deprives the underlying consti-
tutional provision of a meaningful construction. Had the court cho-
sen to pigeonhole community service as yet another exception to the
Thirteenth Amendment, it would at least have focused on servitude,
although it still would have shortchanged the doctrine.
The balancing test used by the Steirer district court looks to the
purpose of the Amendment and offers flexibility. The uniform adop-
tion of this test could breathe life into "involuntary servitude" in the
same way that an expansion of congressional power under the second
section of the Amendment breathed life into the idea of "badges of
slavery." The Thirteenth Amendment, by its own terms, grants liberty
197 See, e.g., United States v. Tivian Labs, 589 F.2d 49,54 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 942 (1979).
198 "Under the guidance of Kozminsk4 we believe it is a mistake to dissect the phrase
'involuntary servitude' into two components." Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987
F.2d 989, 998 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 85 (1993).
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to every citizen, and the Amendment's framers intended it to be an
expansive and potent liberty. When the courts create a workable
scheme for litigation under the Amendment we can finally begin test-
ing and defining this liberty.
Lauren Karest
t The author thanksJohn Chun, whose encouragement made this Note possible, and
her parents, who made law school possible.
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